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Abstract 
 
The language issue within the European constitutional space is one of the most 
fascinating challenges to supranational integration. On the one hand, the 
principle of equal standing of all official and working languages is constantly 
reaffirmed; on the other hand the necessity to simplify the European Babel on 
the basis of a more functional consideration of the language issue seems 
unavoidable. Several solutions have been proposed both by scholars and by 
European institutions. 
The paper argues that there is an intimate contradiction in today’s linguistic 
policy in the EU, oscillating between the need to simplification and the 
constitutional duty to respect linguistic pluralism as imposed by the member 
states. In fact, the language issue is just the mirror of the constitutional law of 
integration as a whole. Looking closer at the constitutional dimension of 
supranational integration cal help better address the language issue too. 
The analysis is divided in four parts, dealing respectively with the role and the 
limits of law in matters of language, the present allocation of competences in 
language-issues, the development of the concept of “integrated constitutional 
space”, and its legal nature under the viewpoint of the language dimension, 
elaborating some tentative proposals.  
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Linguistic Diversity within the Integrated 
Constitutional Space
* 
Francesco Palermo 
 
 
1. Introduction 
According to an anecdote, during the negotiations for Denmark’s accession to 
the EEC, the Danish government proposed to renounce to the official status of 
the Danish language and to adopt English and French as the sole official 
languages of the Community, under the condition that French were forced to 
use English and vice versa.
1 Everybody knows how this ended up. 
In the nation-state building process, language was one of the most relevant 
features of national identity, and even in the peaceful development of 
European integration the language issue played a crucial role in determining 
power structures and relationships.
2 More recently, Austria imposed a protocol 
on the use of specific Austrian terms in the German language in the frame of 
the EU, as a sign of its distinct “national identity”.
3 In addition, during the 
German Presidency of the Union in 1999 – following the Austrian one – 
attempts were made to introduce German as a working language in informal 
meetings of the Council.
4 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 
adopted in Nice in 2000 (hereinafter “The Charter”), states in its Article 22 
 
 
*  This text is based on an article (Linguistic Diversity and National Identity in the Constitution-
Making Process of Europe) to be published in Bruno de Witte and Miriam Aziz (eds.), Linguistic 
Diversity and European Law (Intersentia, Antwerp, forthcoming). 
1  I was not able to find a source to prove it. This anecdote was quoted by a German professor of 
linguistics during a conference I attended some years ago. However, if it is just a myth, it is even 
more significant, because it shows the clear perception of the problem and the need to work out a 
solution. 
2    See Andreas Beierwaltes, “Sprachenvielfalt in der EU. Grenze einer Demokratisierung Europas?”, ZEI 
Discussion Papers (1998) and Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “Die Sprache und der Binnenmarkt im Europa 
der EU: Eine kleine Beziehungsaufstellung in 10 Punkten”, 1 European Diversity and Autonomy 
Papers - EDAP (2005), at http://www.eurac.edu/documents/edap/2005_edap01.pdf.  
3  Act concerning the conditions of accession of Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden, protocol no. 10 
on the use of specific Austrian terms of the German language in the frame of the European Union, 
OJ C 241 of 29 August 1994, 370. In the same occasion, the Kingdom of Norway made a declaration 
(no. 38) which stated that: “in the written use of Norwegian as official language of the institutions 
of the Communities, equal status must be given to Bokmaal and Norsk”, (OJ C 241 of 
29 August 1994, 395). 
4  In the second half of 1999, under Finnish Presidency, the Germans insisted in getting interpreting 
not only into English and French, but also into German, when informal preparatory meetings of the 
Council took place. After the Finns made concessions to appease the German government, Spain and 
Italy began to claim an analogous treatment for their languages. Similar problems arose some years 
later when the Commission proposed to abolish Italian and Spanish in the weekly press conferences. 
See Thomas Oppermann, “Das Sprachenregime der Europäischen Union – reformbedürftig? Ein 
Thema für den Post-Nizza-Prozess”, 1 Zeitschrift für Europäische Studien (2001), 1-21, at 13-16 and 
id., “Reform der EU-Sprachenregelung?”, 37 NJW (2001), 2663-2668. 
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that the Union respects “cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”. 
Meanwhile, 2001 was declared “the ‘European year of languages’”, starting 
from the perspective, that “all the European languages [...] are equal in value 
and dignity from the cultural point of view and form an integral part of 
European cultures and civilization”.
5 This principle is not a mere declaration, 
considering the impressive amount of resources invested by the EU in 
language services and in promotion of languages.
6 In addition, many 
non-binding activities have been undertaken by the EU/EC in order to protect 
and improve linguistic diversity,
7 and enlargement of 2004 brought the 
language issue even more to the fore. Finally, in several declarations and 
resolutions, the European Parliament reaffirmed the strong commitment to 
the equality of all official and working languages of the Union.
8 
A double and contradictory tendency thus emerges. On the one hand the 
principle of equal standing of all official and working languages is constantly 
reaffirmed;
9 on the other hand the necessity to simplify the European Babel 
(especially considering the additional problems deriving from the Eastern 
enlargement) on the basis of a more functional consideration of the language 
issue seems unavoidable. A third element must be considered: even in the 
formal-equality-of-all-languages-approach, many languages, i.e. the minority 
or only partially official languages, are excluded. 
In the (artificial, insomuch as it is institutionally shaped) identity-formation 
process of the EU, again language is playing a fundamental role.
10 Mirroring 
the evolution of monolingual nation states, the constitutional development of 
multilingual Europe takes language as a value. Instead of the “one language – 
 
 
5  Decision No 1934/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 on the 
European Year of Languages 2001, OJ L 232 of 14 September, 1. The same principle lies on the basis 
of Regulation no. 1/1958 of the Council of 15. April 1958, OJ 1958, 386 (not by chance the first 
regulation adopted by the Council in the history of the EC). 
6  To date, translators represents 12% of the Commission’s personnel (30% of the personnel with 
university degree) and the expenses for translations make up 30% of the Commission’s budget. The 
Commission’s translation service is in numerical terms the biggest world institution dealing with 
translations. Further data in Kristina Cunningham, “Translating for a larger Union – can we cope 
with more than 11 languages?”, 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/translation/reading/articles/pdf/2001_cunningham.pdf); Miguel 
Siguan,  L’Europa de les llengües (Edicions 62, Barcelona, 1996), 166-167; Kerstin Loehr, 
Mehrsprachigkeitsprobleme in der Europäischen Union (Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1998) 
and at http://europa.eu.int/comm/translation/index_en.htm. 
7  E.g. financial support to European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (and problems attached) etc. 
8  See in particular resolution no. B5-0770 of 13 December 2001, resolution on measures for minority 
languages and cultures of 11 February 1983 and others. 
9  Such a constant highlighting of the parity of all languages may indicate that the EU needs to 
persuade itself that this is the truth. According to an old Latin saying, “excusatio non petita, 
accusatio manifesta”. 
10  Also in terms of democracy. See further Sue Wright, “Language Issues and Democracy in the 
European Union”, paper presented at the workshop “The Public Discourse of Law and Politics in 
Multilingual Societies”, IVAP, Oñati, 2002 and Philippe van Parijs, “Linguistic Justice”, 
1(1) Philosophy, Politics & Economics (2002), 59-74. 
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one nation – one State” approach,
11 the new paradigm of “many languages – 
many nations – one polity” seems now to be followed, neglecting the 
existence of many languages not officially recognized by the states. Thus, the 
traditional syllogism “language instrumental to identity, identity instrumental 
to power, language instrumental to power” remains the same. Is this the 
correct approach? Does it really take us towards an “ever closer Union”? And, 
finally, are there alternative and perhaps more viable approaches to be 
pursued in dealing with the linguistic issue in the framework of European 
integration? 
This paper argues that the approach followed until now shows many 
deficits. New tentative solutions will be proposed, based on the more recent 
achievements of the integration process, especially considering the new role 
of the member states and the principle of substantive equality in European 
law. 
The paper is an attempt to analyze the role of linguistic diversity in 
Europe’s constitution-making process, as “filtered” through national identity, 
oscillating between its symbolic (identity) and functional (use of languages, 
need of effective communication) dimension as well as between power and 
efficiency on the one hand, and equality (between states and between 
citizens) on the other. The analysis is divided in four parts, dealing 
respectively with the role and the limits of law in matters of language (2), the 
present allocation of competencies in language-issues (3), the development of 
the concept of “integrated State” (4), and its legal nature under the 
viewpoint of the language dimension, elaborating some tentative proposal (5). 
2. Culture, Language and the Role of Law 
Unlike several international organizations, the EU provides no definition of 
either culture or of language.
12 Not even the Charter, despite protecting and 
promoting cultural and linguistic diversity (Article 22), contains any 
clarification of the concepts of culture and language. In the light of the case 
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), two possible meanings of culture 
seem to emerge.
13 The first one considers historical or artistic heritage as a 
 
 
11  In some cases even through the establishment of an artificial, unifying language, such as new-
Norwegian, Hebrew, Basque, etc. 
12  Several attempts to define these concepts, however, have been made by the drafters of some 
international declarations. That is the case, for example, of the UNESCO Declaration of cultural 
policies (adopted in Mexico City in 1982 and based on a very comprehensive concept of culture), in 
the UNESCO draft declaration of cultural rights of 1996, and others. See Roberto Toniatti, “The 
Legal Dimension of Cultural Citizenship”, in Symposium “Integrating Diversity in Higher Education: 
Lessons From Romania”, OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, 2000. 
13  According to Cinzia Piciocchi, “La Carta tra identità culturali nazionali ed individuali”, in Roberto 
Toniatti (ed.), Diritto, diritti, giurisdizione. La Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione europea 
(Cedam, Padova, 2002), 119-134, at 126. 
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possible limitation to the free movement of goods and services;
14 the second 
and larger one also includes all the values contributing to “national cultural 
identity”,
15 thus embracing a wide range of possible cultural choices that the 
ECJ tends to respect
16 and which can be summarized in the concept of 
pluralism. 
A first provisional conclusion is that, in the EU-law perspective, culture and 
language are considered as they are by the member states, and the Union is 
committed to respect and protect diversity and pluralism (in particular 
Article 6 TEU and Article 151 TEC). 
The borderline between culture and language is not easy to define.
17 It is 
rather intuitive that language is only part of a more general and complex 
phenomenon called “culture”, but the interrelations between the two 
concepts are so manifold that it is impossible to clearly distinguish between 
 
 
14  For this interpretation see George Karydis, “Le juge communautaire et la préservation de l'identité 
culturelle nationale”, 30(4) Rev. Trim. de Droit Européen (1994), 551-560. 
15  In the words of Advocate General Van Gerven, opinion delivered on 11 June 1991 in Grogan, 
judgment of 4 October 1991, case C-159/90, ECR 1991, I, 4685 it is necessary  
  to allow the competent national authorities an area of discretion within the limits imposed by 
the Treaty and the provisions adopted for its implementation. There can, in my estimation, be 
no doubt that values which, in view of their incorporation in the Constitution, number among 
‘the fundamental values to which a nation solemnly declares that it adheres’ fall within the 
sphere in which each Member State possesses an area of discretion ‘in accordance with its own 
scale of values and in the form selected by it’ (at 26). And  
  it is for each Member State to define those concepts in accordance with its ‘own scale of 
values’ (at 38). 
16  The “cultural options” of the member states that have yet been challenged in front of the ECJ 
range from domestic rules on abortion (Grogan) to rules on languages (Groener, judgment of 28 
November 1989, case C-379/87, ECR 1989, 3967; Mutsch, judgment of 11 July 1985, case 137/84, 
ECR 1985, 2681; Bickel/Franz, judgment of 24 November 1998, case C-274/96, ECR 1998, I-7637) 
and on the prohibition of Sunday trading (Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City 
Council v B & Q plc., judgment of 16 December 1992, case C-169/91, ECR 1992, I, 6635) and many 
others. “However, it is not sufficient for a national rule to be in pursuance of an imperative 
requirement of public interest which is justified under Community law, it must also not have any 
effects beyond that which is necessary. In other words, it must comply with the principle of 
proportionality” (Advocate General’s opinion in Grogan, 27). 
17  An interesting example under EC Law can be derived from the Konstantinidis case ruled by the ECJ 
in 1993 (judgment of 30 March 1993, case C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig - 
Standesamt e Landratsamt Calw - Ordnungsamt, ECR 1993, I, 1191 – see case notes by Domonique 
Gaurier, 3 European Review of Private Law (1995), at 490 and by Rick Lawson, CMLRev (1994), 
at 395). A Greek national, married in Germany, applied to the Registry Office for the entry of his 
surname in that register to be rectified by changing it from “Konstandinidis” to “Konstantinidis” on 
the ground that the latter spelling indicated as accurately as possible to German speakers the 
correct pronunciation of his name in Greek and that it was, moreover, the way in which his name 
was transcribed in Roman characters in his Greek passport. German law prescribes the transcription 
on the basis of a standard ISO-convention, according to which the applicant’s name was 
transliterated into “Hréstos Kónstantinidés”. The applicant argued that it distorted the 
pronunciation of his name, thus constituting an encroachment contrary to the provisions of the 
Treaty guaranteeing freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. For the Court it is 
contrary to former Article 52 (now 43) ECT “for a Greek national to be obliged, under the applicable 
national legislation, to use, in the pursuit of his occupation, a spelling of his name whereby its 
pronunciation is modified and the resulting distortion exposes him to the risk that potential clients 
may confuse him with other persons”. For Advocate General Jacobs, however, the erroneous 
transcription threatened not only the economic activity of Mr. Konstantinidis, but also his cultural 
identity. 
www.eurac.edu/edap   edap@eurac.edu 
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them. What is relevant for our purposes, however, is that the criteria for the 
analysis of both culture and language are by far the same. Therefore, from a 
(European) constitutional perspective, it seems possible and even necessary to 
analyze language by means of the same conceptual categories.
18 
In the context of a legal analysis of culture and language, two main 
preliminary pre-legal questions should be raised, bearing in mind that no 
definite answers are possible. First, the lawyer must be aware that not every 
single manifestation of culture or language is (nor can be) equally relevant for 
the legal system. On the contrary, the legal system tends to be quite selective 
in recognizing (and even more in protecting) cultural and linguistic difference. 
Thus a first question is when and under which circumstances and conditions a 
culture or language becomes relevant for the legal system and can therefore 
claim legal recognition and protection.
19 M a n y  f a c t o r s ,  s u c h  a s  n u m b e r ,  
proportionality, intensity, political influence, etc. might determine this 
choice.
20 It is clear, however, that it must be decided what, when and under 
what conditions can be considered as a cultural or linguistic group, as well as 
whether and by what means said group may obtain legal protection and/or 
promotion. This decision has to be made by an entity possessing the power to 
establish legal norms that are binding for a group of persons living in a 
territory. In the last four centuries, this entity has been the nation-state, 
which was basically free to choose its approach towards diversity, mostly 
determined by extra-legal factors.
21 Two main models were adopted: inclusive 
on the one hand (based on integration and formal equality, in some cases 
causing assimilation), exclusive on the other hand (based on separation, 
sometimes respectful of formal and substantive equality, sometimes 
degenerating into segregation).
22 This state of the art is now confronted with 
new challenges, since the nation-state (especially in the context of the 
European integration) is no longer the sole owner of the power to “say what 
 
 
18  See Matthias Niedobitek, The Cultural Dimension in EC Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
1997); and Joseph A. McMahon, “Article 128: A Community Contribution to the Cultural Policies of 
the Member States?”, in Stratos V. Konstantinidis (ed.), A People’s Europe. Tuning a Concept into 
Content, EC/International Law Forum III (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 1999), 183-210; Peter Hilpold, 
Bildung in Europa (Nomos, Baden Baden, 1995). 
19  See Roberto Toniatti, “Minorities and Protected Minorities: Constitutional Models Compared”, in 
Tiziano Bonazzi and Michael Dunne (eds.), Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies (Keele 
Univ. Press, Keele, 1995), 195-219. 
20  See Bruno de Witte, “Surviving in Babel? Language Rights and European Integration”, in Yoram 
Dinstein (ed.), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1992), 277-300. 
21  For a brief overview Neus Oliveras Jané, “The Main Concepts in the Recognition of Linguistic Rights 
in European States”, 2 Mercator Working Paper (2001), at 
http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/Menu_nou/index.cfm?lg=gb. 
22 See  Joseph  Marko,  Autonomie und Integration (Böhlau Verlag, Wien, 1995); and id., “Citizenship 
beyond the Nation State? The Transnational Citizenship of the European Union”, in Massimo La Torre 
(ed.),  European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
1998), 369-385. 
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the law is”, and also the concept of citizenship is facing a process of 
transformation.
23 
The second problem the lawyer must be aware of concerns the limits of the 
law’s influence in determining cultural or linguistic rules.
24 In other words, to 
what extent can law pass rules on subjects like language, which are social and 
cultural phenomena and therefore based on conventional, non-legal rules? If 
language is the instrument of (also legal) communication and the basis of legal 
certainty,
25 thus requiring precise rules, linguistic regulation by legal means is 
hardly efficient. Among the possible examples, references can be made to the 
establishment of a binding legal terminology in bilingual or multilingual areas 
like Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, or certain Italian regions and Spanish 
autonomous communities, where special authorities establish the official legal 
terminology in the second/minority language, but their decisions often lack of 
efficiency and social acceptance.
26 The same goes not only for minority 
languages, but also in the case of officially monolingual states. Examples are 
provided by the recent German litigation on orthography, which ended up in 
some decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court,
27 and by the decision of 
the French Constitutional Council on the so-called “loi Toubon”.
28 As the 
German  Bundesverfassungsgericht and the French Conseil contitutionnel 
pointed out, inefficiency of legal rules on how language must be is due to the 
fact that “language belongs to people,” and the natural evolution of a 
 
 
23  For an interpretation on how to possibly combine culture and citizenship in the modern times, see 
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1995). See also the highly 
interesting symposium “The State of Citizenship”, 7(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
(2000), 447-510 (papers by Linda Bosniak, Aristide R. Zolberg, Kim Rubenstein, Daniel Adler, David 
Thelen, Heinz Klug, Saskia Sassen, Susan B. Coutin and Kenneth L. Karst). 
24  Alessandro Pizzorusso, “L'uso della lingua come oggetto di disciplina giuridica”, 6 Le Regioni (1990), 
1329-1347. 
25  See, in this respect, the Declaration on the quality of drafting of Community legislation (Inter-
institutional agreement of 22 December 1998) annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
See also the rich case law of the ECJ on the importance of legal certainty, which is determined also 
by language rules (starting from case 24/62, Germany v. Commission [1963], ECR, 63 up to case C-
6/98, ARD v. Pro Sieben [1999], ECR I-7599). 
26  For example, the Office de la langue française in Quebec, the Translation and terminology office of 
the Swiss Federal Chancery, the Terminology commission established for the parification of 
languages in South Tyrol, the Real Academia de la lengua vasca in the Basque country, etc. See 
further Francesco Palermo, “Insieme per forza? Aporie epistemologiche tra lingua e diritto”, in 
Daniela Veronesi (ed.), Linguistica giuridica italiana e tedesca / Rechtslinguistik des Deutschen und 
Italienischen (Unipress, Padova, 2000), 17-28. 
27  Judgment of 14 July 1998, BVerfGE 98, 218. See Jörg Menzel, “Zur Bedeutung des ß in der 
Staatsaufgabenlehre unter dem Grundgesetz”, in Jörg Menzel (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrechtsprechung. 
Hundert Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in Retrospektive (J.C.B. Mohr, 
Tübingen, 2000), 648-653. The last decisions were adopted in 1999 on the basis of individual claims 
(20 July 1999, 1 BvQ 10/99 and 25 November 1999, 2 BvR 1858/99, NJW (1999), 3477). See also Sally 
Johnson, “The Cultural Politics of the 1998 Reform of German Orthography”, 53(1) German Life and 
Letters (2000), 106-125. For the latest developments see Wolfgang Kopke, „Die Rechtschreibung 
erneut vor Gericht”, 49 NJW (2005), 3538-3541. 
28  Conseil Constitutionnel, decision no. 94-345 DC of 29 July 1994 (on the law on the use of the French 
language), commented by Jean-Pierre Camby, “Le Conseil constitutionnel et la langue française”, 
5 Revue de droit public (1994), 1663-1672. 
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language usually runs counter to a strict normative approach to the language 
issue. 
It can be thus affirmed that law faces several factual and legal obstacles 
when dealing with language issues, and that the establishment of complete 
equality between languages is merely a legal fiction and cannot correspond to 
reality nor can influence it beyond a certain extent. In other words, the 
response to the necessity to improve linguistic pluralism cannot be found only 
in legal instruments, although law can contribute greatly this aim. 
3. Language and National Identity.  
The Role of Member States and the EU/EC as a Multinational 
Polity in Determining the Legal Context of Linguistic Diversity 
As shown, language issues – as far as they can be determined by law 
(especially linguistic rights) – belong traditionally to the realm of nation 
states, and a deferential attitude towards states’ prerogatives in the sphere 
of language is clearly enshrined in the European treaties. The reason is the 
simple syllogism already mentioned: language is something that belongs to 
people; people are the intimate basis of national identity; therefore language 
is the core of national identity, which the EU “respects” (Article 6(3) TEU). 
Nevertheless, the TEC contains some provisions in the fields of culture and 
(to a more limited extent) language. More generally, the Community carries 
out relevant cultural and linguistic policies that obviously have an impact on 
the language policy of the member states.
29 In this section the distinct 
functions of member states and EU concerning language policies shall be 
analyzed. 
From the point of view of the states, language clearly belongs to their 
(national) identity, in the sense that the state is not only a form of 
organization of public power, but also a community of people.
30 Thus, national 
identity of the states means their constitutional identity,
31 and consequently 
their sovereignty. This perception is reflected in the community legal order, 
which considers language part of the national identity of each member state.
32 
 
 
29  See Bruno de Witte, “The Cultural Dimension of Community Law”, 4(1) Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law (1995), 229-299 and id., “The Impact of European Community Rules on 
Linguistic Policies of the Member States”, in Florian Coulmas (ed.), A Language Policy for the 
European Community - Prospects and Quandaries (Gruyter, Berlin, 1991), 163-177. 
30  In the constitutional doctrine, a clear distinction is traditionally drawn between the State as a 
legally organized structure of public power (State as an institution) and the State as a community of 
people subject to specific norms and determining that norms (State as a community). 
31  Roberto Toniatti, “Los derechos del pluralismo cultural en la nueva Europa”, 58(II) Revista Vasca de 
administración pública, (2000), 17-47. 
32 Oppermann,  Das Sprachenregime …, at 21. 
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It is therefore at the level of the member state that the legal identification 
and protection of language(s) and language diversity is determined, whereas 
the role of the Union is limited to the presumption of cultural and linguistic 
diversity (Article 22 of the Charter), to the recognition of the choice made by 
each member state regarding its national identity (Article 6(3) TEU)
33 and, 
where possible, to “contribute to the flowering of cultures of the member 
states, while respecting their national and regional diversity” 
(Article 151(1) TEC). 
So does no European language issue exist at all? Quite the contrary. 
From a states’ constitutional perspective, the question arises, why should 
the Union commit itself to respecting something (the national identity of the 
member states, and thus their languages) that belongs to the inalienable part 
of a state’s sovereignty and could never be touched by the process of 
European integration. From the Union’s constitutional viewpoint, however, all 
those provisions mean the normative assumption of the existence of a variety 
of cultures (and languages) and a constitutional duty to maintain and 
safeguard them and the constitutional rejection of a single European culture 
or language. In other words, being the Union built by (national) states and 
being thus indivisible from them, by no constitutional means can the “ever 
closer Union” ever really melt into a monolingual (mono-national) polity.
34 
Consequently, only the member states can represent the different 
cultural/linguistic communities that (must) constitute Europe, and the 
linguistic pluralism of the Union coincides with the linguistic pluralism of the 
states, including, of course, the sub-national level (as in Finland, Spain, Italy 
and, to some extent, Austria and even the United Kingdom). The European 
(cultural and) linguistic pluralism is determined by the free choice of each 
member state regarding (internal) linguistic and cultural pluralism,
35 and is 
the sum of the identities (culturally and linguistically plural or not) of all 
Member states. Indeed, because the member states are solely responsible for 
the legal recognition (of the existence) of a language, the EU cannot  by 
definition – have minorities in a classical sense. Similarly to countries made up 
of different “regional” or “constituent” peoples (and not minorities) like 
 
 
33  This duty derives, according to some scholars, from the principle of fair cooperation between the 
Community and the Member States (Article 10 TEC). Meinhard Hilf, “Europäische Union und 
nationale Identität der Mitgliedstaaten”, in Albrecht Randelzhofer, Rupert Scholz and Dieter Wilke 
(eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Eberhard Grabitz (C.H. Beck, München, 1995), 157-170, at 167. 
34  Albert Bleckmann, “Die Wahrung der ‘nationalen Identität’ im Unions-Vertrag”, 52 Juristen Zeitung 
(1997), 265-269. 
35  As Hilf points out, apart from being the term “national” in Article 6 TEU legally and culturally 
problematic, the identity that the Union shall respect is only the one of the Member States and by 
no means that of their territorial units, their peoples, their nations (Hilf, “Die Europäische 
Union …”, at 164). It might be added, however, “only as long as the States decide that it must be 
so”. 
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Switzerland, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to some extent Canada, but 
also like countries which do not recognize (the existence of) minorities at a 
central level, attributing culture and language to the regional sphere of power 
(Germany),
36 in the context of the European Union, each member state is and 
represents at the same time a minority
37 and a constituent people.
38 
Consequently, the Community cannot even claim competence in the field of 
(linguistic) minority protection (a classical “internal issue” of member states, 
minorities being primarily defined in the group-state relationship) without 
changing its constitutional nature of a multinational and multi-state polity. 
The EU, indeed, integrates several nations on the basis of forms of 
consociational democracy and “segregation” between the different nations 
(e.g. granting a differentiated representation in the European institutions on 
grounds of nationality, veto rights and even derogation to the enjoyment of 
the free movement of workers where the public administration is concerned, 
Article 39(4) TEC).  In  constitutional  terms, this model of co-existence 
between different peoples (nations, states), based on segregation and free 
cultural choice of the entities, is usually defined as “multinational”. This 
means that the system is the sum of the different nations and nationalities 
which constitute it, and it does not have any power in this field but that to 
regulate nationality-based issues at central level (representation in central 
organs, use of languages, etc.).
39 Nevertheless, the EU shows also some 
(embryonic) features of the second model of co-existence, based on 
integration and imposing an active role on the central level in nationality 
issues (some organs must represent only the Community’s interests, there is a 
common citizenship, whatever that means, and in principle the fundamental 
freedoms are enjoyed without any discrimination on the ground of national 
origin). This opposed model is normally called “multiethnic”. In this particular 
 
 
36  In Germany the issue was raised in the frame of the debate on the constitutional emending process 
of 1994. The proposal to introduce a new Article 20a in the Basic Law to grant a federal protection 
of minorities was rejected on the basis of the exclusive competence of the Länder in cultural 
matters. See Michael Kloepfer, Verfassungsänderung statt Verfassungsreform. Zur Arbeit der 
gemeinsamen Verfasungskommission (Nomos, Baden Baden, 1995) and Anja Siegert, 
Minderheitenschutz in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Erforderlichkeit einer 
Verfassungsänderung (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1999). 
37  Bruno de Witte, “Politics Versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic Minorities”, 4 EUI Working Paper 
RSC (2000) and Toniatti, Los derechos …. Interestingly, also the then President of the Commission 
Prodi, in his speech at the opening session of the Convention on the Future of Europe (28
th February 
2002) defined the EU “a Union of minorities”. 
38  At present, the only truly multinational State belonging to the EU is Belgium. However, the groups 
(and the languages) that are “constituent” in Belgium are at the same time “national” languages in 
other Member States (Netherlands, France and to some extent Germany), and therefore the issue of 
a “constituent multinational State” never properly arose in the EU. 
39 See  Marko,  Autonomie und Integration … ; and id., “n welcher ‘Verfassung’ ist Europa? Einheit – 
Gleicheit + Differenz als juristisch-konstruktives Problem”, in Ulfried Terlitza, Peter 
Schwarzenegger and Tomislav Boric (eds.), Die internationale Dimension des Rechts (FS Posch, 
Wien, 1996), 207-222. 
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case, dealing with linguistic and thus cultural aspects, it should be spoken of a 
“multicultural” approach. 
Put in these terms, it must be concluded that the EU is still a multinational 
polity, although showing relevant and increasing characteristics of a 
multicultural (or, better, intercultural) one.
40 The same goes for language 
regulation: the EU is linguistically the sum of the official languages of the 
member states (multinational), even though the practice shows some features 
of multiculturalism. It is well known that some official languages in the 
member states do not enjoy the same status at Community level (e.g. 
Luxembourgish, Irish,
41 Maltese); that many regional languages do not have 
any formal recognition in Europe (e.g. Catalan, Basque, etc.)
42; that European 
institutions are free to decide how to deal with their working languages 
(Article  5  regulation  1/1958) and even with their official languages;
43 that 
some pieces of legislation cannot even be passed because of language 
problems;
44 and that in practice, almost all institutions can modulate the 
concrete application of the principle of equal status of the languages.
45 
 
 
40  The concept of interculturalism puts the existence of a common domain to the fore, while 
respecting cultural diversity. See e.g. Jagdish S. Gundara, Interculturalism, Education and Inclusion 
(Paul Chapman, London, 2000). In this sense, it seems more adequate for our purposes than 
multiculturalism, even though the terms are still used as synonymous here. 
41  Irish was recently upgraded to an official and working language of the EU, even though with an 
“asymmetrical status”. Council Regulation (EC) No. 920/2005 of 13 June 2005, amending Regulation 
No. 1/1958, provides that from 2007 Irish enjoys the status of full official language, with no 
additional costs for the Community. The Irish government bears the training costs for interpreters 
and translators. Not all documents, however, will be available in Irish: like for the case of Maltese, 
only regulations adopted under the co-decision procedure will be available in Irish. 
42  The picture is getting ever more complex also in this regard. The Kingdom of Spain signed 
administrative agreements with the Commission and the Council (respectively in OJ C 40/2 of 17-2-
2006 and in OJ C 73/14 of 25-3-2006), according to which Spanish citizens can address the European 
institutions in all official languages of Spain, without additional costs for the Community. 
43  See the Kik doctrine of the (Court of First Instance and of the) ECJ, Christina Kik v. Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market, judgment of 2-9-2003, case C-361/01. For more details, 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne, EC Law and Minority Language Policy. Culture, Citizenship and Fundamental 
Rights (Kluwer International Law, The Hague, 2002). 
44  This is the case, for example, of the European trademark. For practical reasons (especially to 
compete in the international market) the European trademark shall be written in English, but many 
States, such as France and Germany, claimed their national languages as official too, and as a result 
the regulation proposal on trade marks was for a long time blocked by cross-veto. An agreement 
was reached in March 2003, according o which from 2010 on European trademarks will be registered 
by the EU in only three official languages (English, French, German) and, if required, in the original 
language (see  http://www.ige.ch/E/jurinfo/pdf/EU-Council_Common_political_approach_e_03-03-
07.pdf). 
45  So does the Council, where, as a matter of fact, documentation is in many cases only drafted in 
English, French and sometimes German. Similarly, the Commission’s debates are mainly drawn up in 
only a few official languages. See for more details Manuel Alcaraz Ramon, “Languages and 
Institutions in the European Union”, 5 Mercator Working Paper (2001), at 
http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/Menu_nou/index.cfm?lg=gb). The Parliament formally 
recognizes the general principle that all documents shall be drafted in all official languages. 
Nevertheless, for practical reasons, translation is made only into English and French, and from there 
back into the other official languages. This causes, as it is easy to understand, serious problems 
where the legal certainty is concerned (for this concern see also Antoni Milian i Massana, “Le régime 
linguistique de l’Union Européenne: le régime des institutions et l’incidence du droit 
communautaire sur le mosaïque linguistique européen”, 3 Rivista di diritto europeo (1995), 
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The constitutional nature of the EU in language issues is thus that of a 
multinational polity, formally deferential to the overwhelming role of the 
member states, but functionally aiming to improve its multicultural elements. 
In the coming pages, the intensity of the EU’s tendency towards 
multiculturalism shall be tested, and it must be analyzed whether, on the 
basis of recent developments in European constitutional law, the present 
language regulation is still in line with the new constitutional scenario of 
European integration. 
4. Who is the Ultimate Guardian of Linguistic Diversity? 
The Role of the “Integrated Constitutional Space” 
The language issue in Europe is certainly – as we have seen – one of the most 
state-based subjects. The states decide, the EU recognizes and respects, and 
cannot even change its role because this would imply a change in its 
constitutional nature, which can be modified only by the states acting 
unanimously. The influence of the Union in the language sphere is limited to 
its own organization, and even in this field the states retain a veto right 
(Article 290 TEC). From a legalistic/formalistic point of view, the Community 
level shall simply surrender to the exclusive state competence in the language 
field. However, there are at least two main reasons, deriving from the theory 
of the constitutional nature of member states (4.1.) and from the analysis of 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ (4.2.1.), respectively, that demonstrate why the 
previous statement cannot be true. Also, the Charter of Nice addresses – 
although quite vaguely – the language issue, and will therefore be analyzed 
from the perspective (of the equality principle and) of its peculiar position in 
the new legal system of constitutional language law of the European Union 
(4.2.2.). 
4.1. The Integrated Constitutional Space and  
“Non Binding – Binding” Constitutional Law 
A state is not the same as a member state. A definition of the kind of state we 
are referring to (4.1.1.) is necessary in order to understand the real meaning 
of the mentioned almost exclusive role of the state in the language sphere 
(4.1.2.). Subsequently, two crucial fields will be analyzed, in which the 
emergence of this new constitutional law becomes particularly clear (4.2.). 
 
 
485-512, at 501. Concrete language use no longer even depends on the territory where the 
institutions are located: for example, the languages used by Eurostat (based in Luxemburg) are 
English, French and German (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/). See further Andrea 
Ortolani, “Lingue e politica linguistica nell’Unione europea”, 21 Rivista critica del diritto privato 
(2002), 203-216 and at http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/. For further examples from the 
translator’s point of view see Domenico Cosmai, Tradurre per l’Unione europea. Il regime 
linguistico della UE (Hoepli, Milano, 2003). 
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4.1.1. Theoretic Foundations 
Unlike the (federal) state-formation process, where the federalizing entities 
can determine the ideological underpinnings and the constitutional values of 
the federation-in-the-making only before the so called “federal big bang”
46 
takes place – i.e., before the federal constitution enters into force, 
transforming their original sovereignty into mere autonomy – in the 
constitution-making process of Europe the permanent nature of the process 
influences and limits the “constitutional way of being” and “form of the 
power”
47 of both the member states and the Union.
48 For this reason, in the 
present European constitution there are many reciprocal “non binding 
bindings” regarding the constitution of the states and the Union. 
This bundle of reciprocal influences, in spite of not being (yet) directly 
justiceable by a court and thus not immediately binding, has enormous legal 
relevance
49. Being a member state can thus imply that for every state, some 
consequences result from its language policy. Although the ECJ cannot rule 
that the use of an official language must be guaranteed on the basis of a 
fundamental right deriving from the common constitutional tradition of 
pluralism, it can reach the same result through the principle of non-
discrimination. 
In general terms, in the context of European integration every state must 
rely on the others as well as the Union
50. This implies the establishment of 
common principles that do not reach the same effectiveness as the common 
constitutional traditions (and are thus not immediately enforceable by the 
courts) but are of great importance in shaping relations between member 
states and the Union: Something which lies in-between soft law and 
constitutional traditions common to the member states. Like conventions in 
the British constitution, it might be said that the mentioned common 
principles are “the flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law”. 
 
 
46  This term is used by Roberto Toniatti, “Federalismo e potere costituente”, in “Proceedings of the 
Conference ‘Regionalismo e federalismo in Europa’”, Trento, 6-7 June 1997, 171. 
47  The term “form of the power” is used by Francisco Rubio Llorente, La forma del poder. Estudios 
sobre la Constitución (CEC, Madrid, 1997). 
48  See, in general, Neil McCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). 
49  It is not by chance that the machinery set up in Article 7 TEU for the case of breach by a Member 
State of the principles laid down in Article 6(1) TEU (liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, rule of law) provides for a highly political control and it does not 
involve the Court of Justice. It is worth noting, in addition, that the procedure under Article 7 TEU 
(which is legally formalized, in spite of being of very political nature) has never been applied, not 
even during the ‘Austrian crisis’ in 2000, which was settled by means of merely political actions. On 
the Austrian crisis and Article 7 TEU see Gabriel Toggenburg, “La crisi austriaca: delicati 
equilibrismi sospesi tra molte dimensioni”, 2  Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo (2001), 
735-755; as well as Peter Pernthaler and Peter Hilpold, “Sanktionen als Instrument del 
Politikkontrolle – der Fall Österreich”, 2 Integration (2000), 105-119. 
50  Already stated in the Declaration on democracy adopted by the European Council in Stuttgart on 7-8 
April 1978 is the idea that in the European system, every State must trust all the others, not only in 
the economic field, but also as far as the protection of fundamental rights is concerned. 
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The existence of common principles and their effectiveness derive from the 
integration among states as well as between them and the EC/EU. Thus, even 
in fields where states retain exclusive competence, the constitutional nature 
of each state and its policies are very much determined by their integration 
with other member states and by their membership in the Union.
51 On the 
other hand, the states (acting together) guarantee that the Union respects 
both the constitutional values they imposed upon it and those to which they 
subordinated themselves by becoming Members of the Union. In this process, 
then, no federal big bang occurs, but a continuous mutual influence is 
constantly in place. 
This phenomenon of “voluntary obedience” or “non binding-binding 
constitutional law”, based on the reciprocal influence between the member 
states and the Union, is similar to what Weiler calls “constitutional 
tolerance”.
52 Very correctly, Weiler states that the member states  
accept [the European constitutional discipline] as an autonomous voluntary 
act, endlessly renewed on each occasion, of subordination, in the discrete 
areas governed by Europe to a norm which is the aggregate expression of 
other wills, other political identities, other political communities. Of course, 
to do so creates in itself a different type of political community, one unique 
feature of which is that very willingness to accept a binding discipline which 
is rooted in and derives from a community of others.
53 
Here we should wonder, however, whether this phenomenon is only a 
matter of fact (or practice, or politics), or if it is also a matter of law. For this 
purpose, it might be useful to make reference to old theories that have been 
developed having regard to the issue of (state) federalism. The first is the so 
called “integration doctrine” (Integrationslehre), elaborated by Smend,
54 
according to which the state only exists because of integration at the 
 
 
51  Bruno de Witte, “Les implications constitutionnelles, pour un Etat, de la participation à un 
processus d'íntégration régionale”, in Ewoud H. Hondius (ed.), Netherlands Reports to the Fifteenth 
International Congress of Comparative Law - Rapports néerlandais pour le quinzième congrès 
international de droit comparé (Intersentia, Antwerpen,1998), 379-393. 
52  Joseph H.H. Weiler, “Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg”, 10 Jean Monnet 
Working Paper (2000), at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html. 
53  Ibid., at 9. To make an example, he adds:  
  The Quebecois are told: in the name of the people of Canada, you are obliged to obey. The 
French or the Italians or the Germans are told: in the name of the peoples of Europe, you are 
invited to obey. In both, the constitutional obedience is demanded. When acceptance and 
subordination is voluntary, and repeatedly so, it constitutes an act of true liberty and 
emancipation from collective self-arrogance and constitutional fetishism: a high expression of 
Constitutional Tolerance. 
54 Rudolf  Smend,  Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1928), at 121; id., 
“Integration” (1956); in id.,  Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere Aufsätze (Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 1994), 475-489; and id., “Integration”, 1 Evangelisches Staatslexikon 
(Kreuz-Verlag, Stuttgart, 1987), 1354-1358. 
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personal, functional and material levels.
55 For Smend, “the State exists only, 
because and insofar it integrates constantly”
56. The most powerful instrument 
for societal integration is the federal state, where the central state 
(composed of the Federation and its Member States) works as a vehicle for 
integration of the state entities, whereas member states are the means for 
integration of individuals into the state structure.
57 Thus the (federal) state, 
integrating individuals and states, cannot be static and clearly defined, 
because it must be constantly adapting itself to the societal changes occurring 
in the process of integration. The same applies, according to Smend, where 
international integration is concerned. This is, in his view, just the second 
step of (domestic) institutional integration, also contributing to the 
permanent process of modification through integration of state entities. It 
follows, in Smend’s theory, that integration (both internal and international) 
is a constitutional duty of the state,
58 and the pre-condition for its very 
existence.
59 
The second theory to refer to is that of the so-called “federal State with 
three elements” (Dreigliedrigkeitslehre), developed by Kelsen
60 and 
Nawiasky
61. This conceptualization points out that the federal state is 
composed by Gesamtstaat (general state), Zentralstaat or Oberstaat (central 
state) and Gliedstaaten (member states). The “general State” includes (and is 
composed by) both the central state and the member states, and is 
hierarchically in a higher position. The general state has its own institutions 
and its own constitutional system, separated from (although integrated into) 
that of the other two levels. The key (and maybe the only) institution of the 
general state is the Constitutional Court, whose primary task is to settle 
conflicts between the central state and member states.
62 In other words, the 
very fact of integration produces the existence of a new constitutional space, 
created by the interaction between constitutional spheres. 
 
 
55 Stephan  Hobe,  Der offene Verfassungsstaat zwischen Souveränität und Interdependenz (Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 1998), 77. 
56 Smend,  Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht …, 138. 
57  Ibid., 229. 
58  Id., “Integration”, 1355. 
59  See also Ingolf Pernice, “Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend und die Europäische Integration”, 120 Archiv 
des öffentlichen Rechts (1995), 100-120. 
60 Hans  Kelsen,  Allgemeine Staatslehre (Julius Springer, Berlin, 1925; Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 
Wien new ed. 1993), 199. 
61 Hans  Nawiasky,  Bundesstaat als Rechtsbegriff (Mohr, Tübingen, 1920); and id.,  Allgemeine 
Staatslehre. Vol. 3 (Benziger, Einsiedeln, Zürich, Köln, 1945-1958), 151. 
62 Kelsen,  Allgemeine Staatslehre …, 201. Thus, the federative element is the Gesamtstaat, whereas 
the  Zentralstaat ( Oberstaat) only performs coordination of the Member States, being separated 
from them but not in a higher constitutional position. It is worth noticed that this theory was 
originally adopted by the German federal constitutional court (BVerfGE 6, 309), but was then 
abandoned in favor of the presently prevailing theory of the federal State composed by only two 
elements, the Federation (Bund) and the Member States (BVerfGE 13, 54). 
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Adapting these theories to the new reality, the new way of integration 
within the European constitutional space, rather intuitive in political terms, 
results more clearly even from a legal perspective. The very existence of the 
new constitutional law deriving from the interaction between EU and Member 
states is based on their reciprocal acceptance of willingness to integrate 
states (and, through them, their citizens) into a larger constitutional, 
state-like space, which is not only the EU, but the constitutional sum of the 
EU and the fifteen member states. Moreover, this integration has been guided 
and shaped by the very organ of the integrated space, the ECJ. 
It seems appropriate to call the product of this new kind of constitutional 
relations (between member states and EU/EC, mostly based on “non binding-
binding” elements or constitutional tolerance) the “integrated state”
63 or to 
speak of “integrated statehood”. More precisely, avoiding the long -lasting 
debate on the essential elements of sovereignty and statehood, the term to 
be used shall be “integrated polity” or “integrated constitutional space”. This 
new concept is based on the consideration that European integration is not 
merely a sum of the constitutional spheres of both the states and the Union, 
but that a constitutional dimension is produced by their mutual integration. 
Such a constitutional sphere of integration, which emerges from their shared 
contacts and influences, is shaped by the reciprocal acceptance of the non-
binding – binding nature of their respective behaviours. 
To be more precise, where states are concerned, it seems necessary to 
distinguish between “integrated” and “Community”-State
64. The latter is just 
part of the first. In Europe, integration is a larger phenomenon that indicates 
the constitutional interrelation and dependency between the states and the 
various “geo-juridical” areas they belong to, e.g. the European Union, the 
Council of Europe, and the OSCE.
65 In this sense, “Community-States” are the 
states whose constitutional nature is affected by their membership in the 
European Union/Communities. Their membership as a constitutional duty is 
already formalized (more or less explicitly) in all member states
66. 
 
 
63  This term is also used (but not explained in its meaning) by Francisco Rubio Llorente, 
“Constitutionalism in the ‘integrated’ States of Europe”, 5 Jean Monnet Working Paper (1998), at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html
64  See Andrea Manzella, Lo Stato “comunitario”, 2 Quaderni costituzionali (2003), 273-294. 
65  The concept of three “geo-juridical” areas in Europe (EU/EC, Council of Europe and OSCE) has been 
developed by Toniatti, Los derechos del pluralismo cultural …, 22. 
66  The constitutions of all Member States contain provisions which “open” the domestic constitution to 
the Membership in the EU (and to other “geo-juridical” areas). See Article 23 Austrian federal 
constitution, Article 34 Belgian constitution, Article 20.1 Danish constitution, Article 23 German 
Basic Law, Article 93 Spanish constitution, Article 28 Greek constitution, Article 29 Irish 
constitution, Article 11 Italian constitution, Article 49-bis Luxembourg constitution, Article 92 and 
94 Dutch constitution, Article 7(6) Portuguese constitution, Article 5 chap. 10 Swedish constitution, 
Article 88 French constitution. No explicit mention in the Finnish constitution, but the norm is 
derived by the scholars. See further Bruno de Witte, “Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of 
the Legal Order”, in Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford 
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The integrated state is a state that m u s t  –  b y  i t s  v e r y  n a t u r e  –  b e  
integrated. Accordingly, the member state is a state that must be member (of 
the EU). The constitutional duty to be integrated derives above all from the 
indivisible interaction between the constitutional spheres of the member 
states and the EU/EC within a common integrated constitutional space, and 
the mutual guarantee of this duty is provided by the reciprocal influence in 
determining their nature much more than by the justiceability before a 
court.
67 
Thus, integration is not only a social phenomenon; it has more and more a 
legal significance, although in a non-traditional (i.e. judiciable) way. 
Integration does not merely describe what happens in the relationship 
between the member states and the Union, but prescribes how this 
relationship ought to be. Indeed, as has been explicitly recognized by some 
constitutional courts, the distinction between the internal and the community 
dimension of the states is increasingly obsolete.
68 Therefore, the theory of the 
integrated constitutional space challenges the dualistic approach of some 
constitutional jurisdictions,
69 because even the issue of supremacy is more and 
more diluted into the integration of the constitutional spheres. 
4.1.2. Integrated Constitutional Space and Linguistic Pluralism 
What are the consequences of this theory applied to linguistic pluralism in the 
European integrated constitutional space? Given that linguistic pluralism 
cannot be imposed by formal rules of the Community, can this occur by means 
of the integrated nature of (member) states and Community? 
Having regard to Article 290 TEC and to Article 8 of regulation no. 1/1958
70, 
the compromise between the double reciprocal imposition within the 
 
 
University Press, Oxford, 1999), 177-214. The role of integration clauses in the constitutions of the 
Member States is analyzed also by Ingolf Pernice, “Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?”, 36 CMLR (1999), 703-750. As far as the 
British constitution is concerned, it seems that the constitutional duty of membership can be 
derived from the European Community Act of 1972 and from the subsequent adhesion to a system 
based on specific principles and rules. See the reasoning of Lord Bridge in Factortame II (1991, 1 
AC, 603, 658), quoted and commented by Paul Craig, “Sovereignty of the United Kingdom After 
Factortame”, 222 Yearbook of European Law (1991), 234-240. 
67  Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. III 
(C.F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, 1988), at 131, describe this phenomenon as “integration through 
diffuse promises” (Integration durch diffuse Verheißung). 
68  See Spanish Constitutional Court, judgment no. 165/1994 of 26 May and German Federal 
Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 2, 347 (374). Contrary, Italian Constitutional court, decision no. 
428/1997. 
69  Followed particularly by the Italian Corte costituzionale (Costa, Frontini, and Granital judgments), 
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht ( Solange and Maastricht), the Danish Supreme Court 
(Maastricht) and the French Conseil constitutionnel (Maastricht II and Amsterdam). A new monistic 
interpretation can be derived also from the integration clauses of the Member States’ constitutions. 
See Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism,…. 
70  “If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be used shall, at the 
request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law”. 
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integrated system appears clear. “Linguistic pluralism within the EU does not 
go beyond a mere interstate pluralism. However – taking into account the 
domestic rules on language of each member state and thus confirming that 
language regulation still remains within the realm of member states – the 
linguistic pluralism of the EU could also comprise the infra-state linguistic 
pluralism. At least on the basis of the text [of Article 8] and of the reference 
to state rules contained in it, it does not seem that the official status of all 
languages must be referred only to the state and to all the state’s territory 
(as in the case of Belgium). On the contrary, it seems that linguistic pluralism 
can (even though it does not necessarily must) also be a territorial or minority 
pluralism (as it could be in the case of Finland, Italy or Spain)”
71. 
In addition, within the integrated constitutional space, the role of the 
“constitutional elements” stemming from other (less integrated) geo-juridical 
areas like the Council of Europe and the OSCE, is of paramount importance in 
the issue of language.
72 In simpler terms, it can be said that what cannot be 
“imposed” by the EU about linguistic pluralism of the states is increasingly 
“recommended” by the Council of Europe and by the OSCE, slowly ratified 
and implemented by the states, and by this means becoming part of the 
integrated space and thus also of EU constitutional law. 
A clarifying analogy can be seen with the emergence of territorial pluralism 
in Europe: For a long time, the EC/EU was considered to be “blind” where the 
internal territorial setting of the member states was concerned but, also due 
to the role played by some crucial acts of the Council of Europe (like in 
particular the Madrid Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Co-operation 
between Territorial Communities or Authorities of 1980), the “communitarian 
status” of the Regions
73 increasingly emerged, and became enshrined in the 
Treaty (Article  263-265), recognized by the courts
74 and addressed by the 
legislation.
75 
It can be concluded that the “integrated state” is a state that can no 
longer freely decide, without considering the existence of the other 
 
 
71 Toniatti,  Los derechos del pluralismo cultural … , 44 (translation by the author). 
72  See, in particular, the Council of Europe’s instruments which have a decisive influence on the 
internal linguistic pluralism of the States, like the European Charter of Regional and Minority 
Languages, the European Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, etc. and 
of course the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
73  Giandomenico Falcon, “La ‘cittadinanza europea’ delle Regioni”, 2 Le Regioni (2001), 327-342. 
74  Cf. in particular, CFI, judgment of 15 June 1999, case T-288/97, Friuli-Venezia Giulia v. 
Commission, ECR at 1871 and judgment of 15 December 1999, cases T-132/96 and T-143/96, 
Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG and Volkswagen Sachsen GmbH v. Commission, ECR, at 3663, 
when the Court recognized an autonomous locus standi for Regions. 
75  See, in particular, the whole regional policy of the EU. This is even clearer taking into consideration 
the role of Regions in the context of the new European governance, as recognized also in the 
Commission’s White Paper of 2001. See Roberto Toniatti et al., European Governance (European 
Academy, Bolzano/Bozen, 2002). 
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constitutional levels, upon issues affected by different layers of governance, 
even if they formally fall into its exclusive sphere of competence. states are 
still the masters of the language rules within the EU, but only insofar as they 
are integrated. Linguistic pluralism is thus a constitutional consequence of the 
integrated nature of the member states, which the Union first contributes to 
influence, and then imposes on itself to respect. 
4.2. How does the “Integrated Constitutional Law” Operate? 
Applications 
4.2.1. The Role of the ECJ 
The role of the (integrated) states as the absolute masters of the language 
issue in Europe must be read and can be better understood in the light of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
The phenomenon of massive intervention of the ECJ in shaping the concrete 
contents of European law is well known,
76 being part of the overall expansive 
tendency of the role of courts in modern societies (judicial creativity, or 
judicial activism).
77 This is even more evident when examining the tendency 
of the ECJ to include fields within the scope of the treaty that were originally 
excluded from it: a phenomenon that can be called “judicial spill-over”.
78 As 
far as language rights are concerned, the ECJ has already considered them 
“instrumental” to the enjoyment of other individual rights and freedoms, and 
only by this means they can be protected under European law. Although so far 
the constitutional commitment to (linguistic) pluralism has never been 
challenged in the European court system and the ECJ has guaranteed the right 
to use one’s own language only on the basis of the principle of non-
discrimination and not on the principle of linguistic pluralism,
79 one could 
 
 
76  Martin Shapiro, “The European Court of Justice”, in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, The Evolution 
of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), 321-347. 
77  See Carlo Casonato, “Judges and Rights: Creativity, Restraint and Legitimacy”, in id. (ed.), The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe: Lessons from Canada (Università degli Studi, 
Trento, 2003), 27-53. 
78  The term “judicial spill-over” indicates a phenomenon according to which the decision of the ECJ to 
extend its jurisdiction over a subject which did not (or not clearly) fall within its competence 
determines in practice the “communitarization” of that subject. The case Angonese could be an 
example: as admitted also by the advocate general’s conclusion, the jurisdiction of the ECJ over 
that case was at least doubtful, given that an Italian citizen residing in Italy suited an Italian bank in 
front of an Italian judge contesting an Italian law. In addition, the diploma required for the job had 
no relevance with Mr. Angonese’s studies in Austria, being conferred by an Italian high-school. 
Surprisingly, the ECJ simply declared its jurisdiction on the case because “it is far from clear that 
the interpretation of the community law [the national judge] seeks had no relation to the actual 
case or to the subject matter of the main action” (ECJ, Angonese, at 19). Another recent example 
of a mere internal issue in which the Court affirmed its jurisdiction can be found in the case 
Guimont, judgment of 5 December 2000, case C-448/98. 
79  In two more relevant cases dealing with the right to use a language, Mutsch (ECJ, judgment of 
11 July 1995, case 137/84, Mutsch, ECR 1985, 2681 – see Anthony Arnull, “Social Advantages and the 
Language Barrier”, European Law Review (1985), 346-348; and Bruno de Witte, “Il caso Mutsch: 
libera circolazione dei lavoratori e uso delle lingue”, IV Il Foro italiano (1987), 8-13) and 
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argue that the ECJ could hypothetically guarantee the use of an official 
minority language (to a citizen of the EU, a regional government, a member of 
a minority, etc.) as a fundamental right enshrined in the common 
constitutional heritage of pluralism.
80 Indeed, the jurisprudence of the ECJ in 
language issues shows that the respect of the choice of linguistic pluralism of 
member states can go so far that it prevails in practical terms even over the 
freedoms of the Treaty, as it results from the Groener doctrine.
81 
It thus follows that (linguistic) pluralism is not (yet) a common 
constitutional tradition, but certainly a common principle of the integrated 
constitutional space which is enforceable also under European law, but only as 
far as the states decide to be pluralistic and therefore to include (linguistic) 
pluralism within their national (i.e. constitutional) identity (Article 6(4) TEU). 
However, as long as linguistic pluralism cannot be considered part of the 
common constitutional traditions, given the fact that in some member states 
the recognition of linguistic diversity is explicitly denied (France
82, Greece, 
the Baltic States) or simply nonexistent (Sweden, Netherlands, Portugal), the 
practical consequence of the absence of any Community provision (and 
competence) in the field of language use within the states is paradoxically not 
the absence of jurisdiction by the ECJ, but “merely” the coverage of the 
language issue by the Treaty’s freedoms. Since language in the European 
context is very much linked to free movement, it can be concluded that 
language obstacles shall be removed every time they constitute a barrier for 
the enjoyment of the Treaty freedoms. 
In addition, as language promotion is often an exception from the principle 
of equality
83 (which is something greater and wider than the mere principle of 
non-discrimination), many national rules can collide with European principles 
aiming to ensure equal conditions to all European citizens in enjoying the 
fundamental freedoms granted by the Treaty without any discrimination. This 
because minority (and language) protection could mean (positive) 
discrimination based on the principle of (substantive) equality, and this may 
imply a violation of the principle of non-discrimination (formal equality). 
 
 
Bickel/Franz (ECJ, decision of 24 November 1998, case C-274/96, Bickel-Franz, ECR 1998, I-7637 – 
see Gabriel Toggenburg, “Der EuGH und der Minderheitenschutz”, 1 European Law Reporter (1999), 
11-15) the Court ruled merely on the basis of the freedoms granted by the Treaty (now Articles 39 
and 40). 
80   Toniatti, Los derechos del pluralismo cultural …, at 44. 
81  ECJ, case 379/87, Groener v. Ministry of Education, ECR 1989, 3967. See also the case Angonese. 
82  See, in particular, the judgment of the Constitutional council on the ratification of the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, no. 99-412 DC of 15 June 1999 and, more recently, the 
decision on the law granting new autonomous powers to Corsica, no. 2001-454 DC of 17 January 
2002. Some interesting indicators of possible future changes are now emerging. See Françoise 
Benoît-Rohmer, “Les langues officieuses de la France”, 45 Revue française de droit constitutionnel 
(2001), 3-29. 
83  Sergio Bartole, “Minoranze nazionali”, Novissimo Digesto (UTET, Torino, 1985), Appendix V, at 44. 
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In other words, being the ECJ limited in its interpretation by the lack of 
Community competence in the field of language, it cannot consider the 
legitimate aims of the states in protecting language diversity if state rules run 
counter the freedoms of the Treaty (unless the member states recognize 
(internal) linguistic pluralism as part of their national identity). The ECJ case 
law in linguistic issues illustrates, in the absence of substantial normative 
European rules in this field, that the lack of competence at the EU level by no 
means prevents the ECJ from scrutinizing the compatibility of national rules 
on language with the Treaties.
84
 
Thus, the competence of member states in language issues is by no means 
exclusive, but increasingly determined by the integrated nature of the 
European constitutional space (which recognizes the existence of a principle 
of linguistic pluralism) and by the jurisprudence of the ECJ (which excludes 
the existence of a common constitutional tradition of linguistic pluralism). 
Paradoxically, insofar as rules on multiculturalism (e.g. minority 
protection, linguistic rights, etc.) are still outside the sphere of European 
regulation, the EU cannot determine how far special provisions can go and 
how legitimate the aim of protecting minorities or languages can be, simply 
because no European (Community) standard exists. Therefore, as far as the 
mere functional-economic dimension of EC-law prevails (the four ECT-
freedoms), the Court will always be forced to give preference to current, 
prevailing European principles, which are economically oriented and aim to 
grant the same conditions to all European citizens without any discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality (formal equality). On the contrary, only if some 
general standards in favour of linguistic diversity become enshrined in EC-law 
will the ECJ be able to balance principles like legitimate protection of 
differences with equal conditions for all European citizens. Until recently, the 
ECJ could only apply the principle of non discrimination (formal equality) 
when dealing with language-related issues, though these at least potentially 
collide with the principle of substantive equality. The latter principle has very 
limited recognition in EC-law, and applies, in practice, only in the field of 
equal treatment of men and women (Article 141 ECT).
85 It is not by accident 
that the jurisprudence of the ECJ in this regard is much more benevolent 
where the legitimacy of exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination is 
concerned.
86 In some fields that affect linguistic diversity, where there is a 
competence of the Community (e.g. language requirements on labels for some 
 
 
84  See Francesco Palermo, “The Use of Minority Languages: Recent Developments in EC-law and 
Judgments of the ECJ”, 8(3) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2001), 299-318. 
85  Cf. Uwe Kischel, “Zur Dogmatik des Gleichheitssatzes in der Europäischen Union”, 1 EuGRZ (1997), 
1-11. 
86  Even though the scrutiny remains very strict. See in particular case 450/93, Kalanke, [1995], ECR 
1995 I-3051, judgment of 11 November 1997, case C-409/95, Marshall, judgment of 28 March 2000, 
case C-158/98 (Badeck) and others. 
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products or trademarks), this balancing has already been, if not reached, at 
least pursued with some success: even if the Court were to rule against 
special provisions, the attitude seems to be much more open and tolerant 
regarding diversity.
87 
Thus, the more the EU has explicit competence in the fields affecting 
multiculturalism, the less danger for national provisions to be withdrawn 
because in contrast to the principles of the treaties.
88 This is due to the fact 
that protection of diversity is implemented by rules that constitute an 
exception, if not a (legitimate) violation, of the principle of formal (de jure) 
equality, aiming to pursue the substantive (de facto) equality, whereas the 
freedoms laid down in the Treaty are committed to non discrimination and 
thus to formal equality. 
All this means, in other words, that the case law of the ECJ somehow 
regarding language issues will always constitute an obstacle for national rules 
aiming to improve multiculturalism (e.g. minority protection) as long as EC-
law does not expressly allow the Court to also apply the principle of 
substantive equality and thus establish a balance between principles that are 
equally protected by the treaties. As already stated above, if member states 
want to effectively protect their special legislation on linguistic/cultural 
diversity, and therefore to affirm their internal pluralism, they must provide 
the EU with at least some competence in this regard. By doing so, they will 
enable the ECJ to take into consideration and to balance not only economic 
freedoms, but also the protection of diversity as an European value. 
 
 
87  A quite interesting jurisprudence has been recently developed by the ECJ on this regard. This is 
mostly due to the fact that the EC has passed some pieces of legislation on that, aimed to 
guarantee also the respect for linguistic diversity among Europe. Therefore, also the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ can take this aim into due consideration, balancing it with the economic-inspired 
freedoms laid down in the Treaty. Thus, the decisions of the ECJ on linguistic requirements in 
labeling of products and trade marks are paying much more attention (at least formally) to the 
specific needs of multiculturalism than the judgments given in “pure” minority issues. See the 
landmark decisions in Piageme (case C-369/89, ECR 1991, I-2971) and Piageme II (case C-85/94, 
Groupement de producteurs, importaters et agents généraux d’eaux minerals étrangères), 
affirming and interpreting the concept (already enshrined in the directove 79/112) of 
“understandable language”. More recently ECJ, judgment of 3 June 1999, Colim NV v. Bigg's 
Continet Noord NV, case C-33/97, ECR 1999, I-3175 (cf. Arianna Vedaschi, “L'uso della lingua nelle 
etichette dei prodotti alimentari e la giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia”, VI DPCE (1999), 
1633-1636); ECJ, judgment of 21 September 1999, BASF AG v. Präsident des Deutschen Patentamts, 
case C-44/98, ECR 1999, I-6269 (cf. Elisabetta Palici di Suni Prat, Brevetti europei e uso delle 
lingue in Europa, I DPCE (2000), 117-120) and ECJ, judgment of 12 September 2000, Geffroy, case 
C-366/98, ECR I-6579. 
88  See e.g. the explicit coverage of national affirmative actions laid down in Article 5 of directive 
2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ L 180, 19/07/2000). 
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4.2.2. The Role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
In this context, it could be argued whether the “solemn proclamation”
89 of the 
Charter will play a role in the described process of mutual influence between 
member states and EU in language issues. Also considering the normative 
sense of Article 6(3) TEU, described above, it can be said that Article 22 of 
the Charter, which states that the Union respects “cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity”, contains a positive obligation: the Union is obliged to 
respect, among other things, linguistic diversity.
90 
This provision is contained in a document – the Charter – which generally 
does not recognize collective rights or, better, “complexity rights” such as 
direct democracy rights, cultural rights, language and minority rights, rights 
of future generations, etc. Certainly, the Western legal tradition
91 “places the 
individual at the heart of [States’] activities” (preamble of the Charter), and 
this is precisely what the ECJ constantly affirmed in its jurisprudence 
regarding what can be named “complexity rights”.
92
 And there is no doubt 
that the Charter, by making rights “more visible”, refers almost exclusively to 
individual rights.
93
 
In simple words, European society is (and claims to be) much more complex 
than it appears in the Charter. Leaving aside the different forms of 
government and governance, direct and indirect democracy, etc., it cannot 
be stressed enough that within the territory of the EU there is a considerable 
number of ethnic and linguistic minorities,
94
 and that language is most 
 
 
89  Bruno de Witte, “The Legal Status of the Charter: Vital Question or Non-Issue?”, 1 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law (2001), 81-89. 
90  Aalt Willem Heringa and Luc Verhey, “The EU Charter: Text and Structure”, 1 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law (2001), 11-32, at 28. 
91 Harold  Berman,  Law and Revolution, I- The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA., 1983). 
92  “Complexity rights” are e.g. collective rights or individual rights to be used only collectively, like 
some minority rights, rights of democratic participation, etc. See for this approach ECJ, judgment 
of 17 October 1995, Kalanke case C-450/93, in ECR, I-3051, where the Court, examining an 
affirmative action policy for women’s employment, states that every “derogation from an individual 
right [...] must be interpreted strictly” (at 21). Similarly decision of 15 May 1986, case 222/84, 
Johnston, in ECR, 1651 (at 36) and many others. 
93  See Stefano Rodotà, “La Carta come atto politico e documento giuridico”, in Andrea Manzella, Piero 
Melograni, Elena Paciotti and Stefano Rodotà, Riscrivere i diritti in Europa (Il Mulino, Bologna, 
2001), 57-89, at 87. 
94   See on minorities and EU Law de Witte, Politics Versus Law …; id., “The European Community and 
its Minorities”, in Catherine Brölmann, René Lefeber and Morjoleine Zieck (eds.), Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993), 167-185; Department 
“Ethic Minorities and Regional Autonomies”, Package for Europe. Measures for Human Rights, 
Minority-protection, Cultural Diversity and Economic and Social Cohesion (European Academy, 
Bolzano/Bozen, 1998) and Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “A Remaining Share or a New Part? The Union's 
Role vis-à-vis Minorities after the Enlargement Decade”, 15 EUI Working Papers (2006), at 
http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/4428/1/LAW+2006.15.pdf  
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definitely an issue.
95 But the Charter seems to ignore all the “complexity 
rights” that a complex society requires. 
This is particularly evident if one considers the equality principle, which is 
the typical parameter for constitutional interpretation and is of paramount 
importance in the language issue. It is well known that the absence of a 
general clause on equality in the Treaties has limited the intervention of the 
ECJ, even though the Court derived it from the spirit of the Treaty.
96
 The 
Charter’s provision on equality is limited to the very general statement of 
Article 20 (“everyone is equal before the law”), whereas the subsequent 
principle of non-discrimination (Article 21) includes a wide range of 
protection.
97
 
Up to this point, the limits of the Charter in regulating the language issue 
have been detailed. But for the purpose of this paper, the legal nature of the 
Charter is of particular significance. 
The Charter has (still) no binding character. Nonetheless, its relevance in 
non-legal analysis can, at least in a short- to medium-term perspective, imply 
significant consequences also in legal terms. Firstly, the Charter shows a 
strong “psychological-symbolic” dimension: it somehow represents the “state 
of art” in the process of constitutionalization of Europe, as it derives from the 
name “Convention” given to the body that elaborated it, as well as from some 
provisions which, in spite of being legally redundant, represent milestones of 
constitutional European identity (prohibition of the death penalty, bio-ethics, 
etc.). Secondly, the Charter has a significant “sociological” dimension. It 
contributes to the development of a common European identity through the 
self-identification of the Union as a legal-constitutional community and by 
overcoming the “democratic deficit” of the European integration
98 by means 
of the new procedure for its elaboration. In other words, the Charter is a 
crucial step for the development of a European Verfassungspatriotismus, 
based on the effectiveness of symbols in the integrated constitutional space. 
 
 
95  See Philippe Van Parijs, “Should Europe Be Belgian? On the Institutional Design of Multilingual 
Polities” in Karl Hinrichs, Herbert Kitschelt and Helmut Wiesenthal (eds.), Institutionenkonflikt in 
kapitalistischen und postsozialistischen Gesellschaften (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 2000), 
59-77. 
96  ECJ, decision of 17 April 1997, case C-15/95, EARL, in ECR, I-1961. 
97  The grounds for non discrimination mentioned in Article 21 are: “sex, race, color, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation”. For a different 
interpretation, see Rodotà, La Carta come atto politico …, 82, who mentions the necessity to reach 
a political compromise within the Convention. 
98  Against the rhetoric of the “democratic deficit” see Joseph H.H. Weiler, “The Transformation of 
Europe”, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), 2403-2483. 
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What are the consequences for the legal system? To answer this question, it 
is useful to refer to the case of France, which is considered the cradle of 
human rights. As in the legal order of the Community, under France’s 1958 
constitution the protection of fundamental rights was developed without a 
general bill of rights, and was the result of a process of judicial incorporation 
of different sources of fundamental rights (bloc de constitutionnnalité).
99 The 
French Constitutional Council ruled on the basis of acts that were no longer in 
force (the 1789 Declaration of Human and Citizen’s Rights) and had no binding 
character (the preamble of the 1946 Constitution). In the same way, the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ on fundamental rights was originally based on quite 
vague sources of law (the common constitutional traditions) or on sources that 
were not even part of the Community’s own legal system (the ECHR). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Charter potentially represents, 
alongside with the common constitutional traditions, the ECHR, the case-law 
of the ECJ and the legal norms of the Community, part of the bloc de 
constitutionnalité of the EU/EC, regardless of its non-binding legal nature.
100 
This is already confirmed by the references made in some recent decisions by 
advocate generals (even though not yet in decisions of the Court)
101 in a 
judgment of the Court of First Instance
102 and even by the Italian 
Constitutional court
103. 
To conclude, the Charter can be considered a pivotal example of the new 
law of integration, which we have called “non-binding binding constitutional 
law”. Its role can become relevant even in the field of language, although its 
normative contribution to the issue is apparently very modest. 
Who is then the ultimate guardian of language diversity: The European 
Union (assuming the cultural/linguistic citizenship of individuals and the 
multicultural character of the polity) or the state (transferring its cultural 
identity at European level)? From the perspective of the positive Treaty law 
(and of the text of the Charter) as well as the viewpoint of the ECJ, the states 
are still “the masters of the language rules”. However, from a broader 
constitutional perspective including the new “integrated constitutional law” 
 
 
99  See in particular decision of the Conseil constitutionnel no. 71-44 DC of 16 July 1971. 
100  The analogy between the evolution of human rights in the Community system and the theory of the 
bloc de constitutionnalité has been made by Bruno de Witte, “The Past and Future of the European 
Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights”, in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), 865-897. 
101 The Charter was mentioned for the first time by advocates general Alber (case C-340/99, TNT 
Traco) and Tizzano (case C-173/99, BECTU), even though the Court, in its decisions, did not make 
any reference to the Charter. References are to be found in several other conclusions (case 
C-270/99,  Z v. Parliament, case C-49/00, Commission v. Italy, case C-377/98, The Netherlands 
v. Council). 
102  CFI, judgment of 20 February 2001, case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v. Commission. 
103  Judgment no. 135/2002. This fact might be of particular interest in the perspective of “integrated 
constitutional law”. 
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and of which the substantive role of the Charter is an example, this 
assumption shall be mitigated in the light of the theory of the integrated 
constitutional space. Thus, it can be said that the law of language in the 
European Union is basically (formally) determined by the states, but the 
constitutional nature of the states (and therefore their decisions) is 
determined by the process of integration and by its new constitutional law, of 
which member states are at the same time “masters and servants”. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
5.1. Integrated Constitutional Law of Language 
In spite of the wording of EU primary and secondary law, it is thus simply far 
from realistic to affirm that the member states are the sole “masters of the 
language(s)” in the European Union. The EU and the other protagonists of the 
integrated constitutional space (especially the Council of Europe) also play 
crucial roles in this regard and, more generally, language law in Europe is ever 
more a matter of integrated constitutional law rather than the product of 
autonomous choice by “sovereign” states. Moreover, it must not be forgotten 
that language and language rules basically evolve outside the law, and thus 
the role of law is basically (although not exclusively) to formalize what reality 
has already spawned. In addition, the paper showed that, as far as the 
predominant role of member states is still in place, the functionally and 
formal-equality-oriented case law of the ECJ can represent a danger to 
linguistic pluralism within the member states (and thus indirectly, by means 
of integration, within the EU itself). 
The constitutional reality of the integrated constitutional space radically 
challenges the traditional system of the sources of law, as well as the theory 
of division of power between the EU and its member states. Consequently, 
even the principle of the states’ exclusive competence in the field of 
language is put into question. The active role of the Community in this regard, 
already in place as a matter of fact (with serious consequences also in the 
realm of law), needs now to be formalized, especially considering the possible 
negative consequences of the ECJ-jurisprudence for the development of 
pluralism in the constitutional law of the EU. 
For both practical (efficiency, practices already followed by the 
institutions) and theoretical reasons (the role of the integrated constitutional 
space and mutual interdependencies between the member states, European 
Union, Council of Europe, etc.) the formal principle of complete parity of all 
languages is cosmetic,
104 utopian and in many aspects even misleading. This 
 
 
104 Miriam Aziz, “Multi-Level Linguistic Governance and the Modesty of the Constitutional Moment” 
(Paper prepared for the Trento Workshop on European Governance, 2002, unpublished) affirms that 
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has largely been recognized by the doctrine, which advocates a separation 
between the official languages – which shall be the official languages of the 
member states – and the working languages – which can be reduced to only 
some of them on the basis of a functional choice.
105 
Does this separation resolve the problems, or is a further step necessary? 
The mere distinction between official and working languages can be a viable 
compromise, even though it would leave both the delicate issue of regional 
and minority languages and the problem of factual inequality among 
languages unresolved. 
5.2. Towards a Functional and Multicultural Approach to Language 
Equality? 
Presently, the final decision in language issues remains with the member 
states, but this decision is determined by the integrated character of those 
states into a system that tends to promote mobility and equal linguistic rights 
for citizens, rather than the mere equality of the languages among 
themselves. The conclusion to be drawn is that the EU/EC, although showing 
increasing consideration for the language issue, is at this very moment, from 
the constitutional point of view, still a multinational and not a multicultural 
polity. In other words, from a strictly legal perspective, the (multinational) 
nation-state approach is still prevailing, even though the “integrated” nature 
of the member states and the individual-rights-based approach adopted by the 
ECJ (and, for the future, by the Charter) is paving the way towards an 
increasing consideration of the substantive equality of the citizens instead of 
the formal equality of languages. 
As a matter of fact (and of integrated constitutional law), the principle of 
formal equality of all (official) languages in the European Union is often 
neglected, and mirrors a quite hypocritical concept of equality, as is often the 
case when equality is based solely on formal (and formalistic) 
non-discrimination instead of considering substantial elements. In this regard, 
the clear statements of the CFI (and of the ECJ) in Kik show that legal reality 
also differs from what is generally believed or assumed (as in the case of the 
 
 
in the realm of language rights “the danger is that constitutional provisions will be merely cosmetic 
and, by implication, rhetorical”. 
105 See, recently, Oppermann, Das Sprachenregime der Europäischen Union …; and Alcaraz Ramos, 
Languages and Institutions in the European Union …. Most of the proposals advocate either a 
distinction between official and working languages, or a simplification of the language regime 
reducing working languages to two (English and French), three (English, French and German), five 
(including Spanish and Italian), or, in the view of enlargement, to a couple of languages 
representing each linguistic family (Germanic languages: English and German; Latin languages: 
French, Italian and Spanish; Slavic languages: Polish). For this last proposal see Beniamino Caravita 
di Toritto, “How many Languages will the Europeans Speak?”, in federalismi.it (2002), available at 
http://www.federalismi.it.  
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“Emperor’s new clothes”). There is, in other words, an increasing distance 
between the law in the books and the law in action. 
A more viable approach, taking into due consideration the multicultural 
elements “imposed” by the integrated nature of the European constitutional 
space, should leave room for a more substantive understanding of the equality 
principle between languages. This means, in simple terms, that equal 
situations must be treated equally, and different situations differently. Now, 
it is evident that languages are not equal within the European constitutional 
space, given on the one hand the social and economic privilege that some 
languages enjoy and, on the other hand, the non-recognition or only partial 
recognition of several languages (e.g. regional or minority languages) by the 
member states and thus by the Community. Why, then, insist on a paradox? 
Languages – and the right to use a certain language – are not equal, but, in 
order to respect and maintain diversity, deserve equal protection and equal 
treatment. This implies the duty to treat equally only what is equal and to 
treat differently what is different, like the languages. Paradoxically, the 
increasing attention paid in EC law to the principle of substantive equality 
could lead to the consequence that the present fiction of equal treatment of 
non-equal languages could even be assumed as a violation of the principle of 
equality. 
Like every other fundamental right, the right to use a language must be 
balanced with other fundamental rights in the pursuance of the general 
objectives of the “State” (in our case, of the “integrated constitutional 
space” and, in particular, of the EU). No right enjoys absolute protection, and 
no right is always prevailing over other constitutionally protected rights. More 
correctly, every right must be balanced with others, and the concrete level of 
guarantee is the result of this interpretation. In many constitutional contexts, 
for example, the constitutionally protected right to language gives the floor to 
other rights in case of possible contrast. This is the case, for example, of the 
right to use one’s own language in court proceedings, which in some 
circumstances is “sacrificed” in favour of other fundamental rights, such as 
the speed of the trial, the territorial principle (connected with the costs of 
judicial proceedings) or other prevalent economic interests.
106 
 
 
106  An interesting example is the quite complex regulation of the use of languages in the South Tyrolean 
court system (presidential decree no. 574/1988 as modified by decree no. 283/2001). The 
preference for speed of the trial is reflected e.g. in Article 17, which states that the language of 
the trial can be changed only once during the same stage of the trial; the preference for the 
territorial principle in connection with the costs of judicial proceedings is contained in Article 13, 
which limits the right to conduct proceedings in German exclusively to the territory of South Tyrol 
(or of the Region Trentino-South Tyrol); the preference for other prevalent economic interests is 
shown by Article 20, which contains the principle of the free renounce to language in order to speed 
up the proceeding. 
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Accordingly, many fundamental rights – like environmental rights – are 
constantly balanced with others, such as economic rights or freedom of 
movement, and sometimes the enjoyment of those rights is “sold” in order to 
better achieve the enjoyment of other rights.
107 Today, “language-points” 
(analogous to “eco-points”) might be a mere provocation, but in the not too 
distant future, they may become a reality.
108 This would mean, for instance, 
that in the context of the presumption of equal treatment of all languages 
(which can be maintained by adapting the presently quite popular proposal to 
distinguish between official and working languages), the renouncement of 
some linguistic rights by some states (not necessarily by the citizens) can be 
accepted on the basis of other (especially economic) concessions and 
privileges within the European arena. 
It seems appropriate to treat language like any other fundamental right, 
and not like a “taboo” of the member states’ increasingly questionable 
sovereignty. Like many other features of their national identities, language 
rights, too, should thus be (and in fact already are) “negotiable” to a certain 
degree, balancing the equality between the (national identity of the) member 
states (multinational element) with the freedoms of the Treaty (functional 
element) and the rights of citizens (multicultural element). Both citizens and, 
above all, states may prefer to effectively enjoy other rights than 
ineffectively insist on the formally equal status of the states’ languages, 
 
 
107 A provoking (and for many reasons negative) example comes from the recent and not yet fully 
concluded litigation of the so-called ‘eco-points’ in Austria. The fundamental right to environmental 
integrity and the Austria’s compelling national interest to preserve it have been balanced with the 
benefits deriving from the European free movement of persons and goods: in practice, the right to 
transit through Austria (and thus to pollute the environment) has been ‘sold’ to a certain degree to 
heavy transport vehicles. After the annual bonus had always been rapidly consumed by the drivers, 
Austria was forced to negotiate a higher number of eco-points. With its order of 23 February 2001, 
case C-445/00, Austria v. Council, ECR, I-1461 the ECJ admitted the urgency of the question raised 
on this regard and provisionally suspended the application of the provision limiting the transit of 
heavy goods vehicles. The ECJ stated (at 116) that the decision must be adopted through “the 
balancing of the interests for which the applicant seeks protection and the damage to the internal 
market which the Council […] claim would result if suspension of operation were granted”. A very 
convincing comparison between language rights and environmental rights in the viewpoint of “public 
goods” is now made by Idil Boran, “Global Linguistic Diversity, Public Goods and the Principle of 
Fairness”, in Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten (eds.), Language Rights and Political Theory (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003), 189-209. 
108  In a report by the Council of the EU of 6 December 2002 on the “Use of languages in the Council in 
the context of an enlarged Union” (no. 15334/1/02 REV 1, CAB 23 ELARG 415), the Presidency 
suggests possible approaches “in order to tackle the difficulty of reconciling the objective 
constraints […] with needs for interpreting in Council preparatory bodies after enlargement”. 
Starting from the broad support already existing for moving away from full language interpreting (at 
least in certain areas), one of the proposals seems particularly interesting from the perspective of 
this paper. The Presidency proposes the “introduction of some form of “requests and pay” system 
under the Council budget”, which includes the allotment to each Member State an equal allocation 
of funds under the Council budget. “Member States would then be charged on the basis of requests 
for interpretation on a fair basis […], with the incentive that any unused amounts would be 
reimbursed to the Member State in question”. In September 2006 the European Parliament adopted 
an initiative on interpretation expenditure, urging the Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
to endeavour to reduce “implicit or explicit stand-by duty”. The Parliament supports 
multilingualism but urges for “pragmatic solutions” over rising interpretation costs (see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5303102).  
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which is often a mere idol of the states’ sovereignty. The functional scenario 
for language rights in the integrated European constitutional space seems to 
be the preservation and enforcement of the equality of the speakers (based 
on the “free”, although maybe economically supported choice) rather than 
the equality of the languages (based on “imposition”).
109 
However, as this paper has demonstrated, the distinction between free 
choice and imposition in the integrated constitutional space is very subtle, 
and in some cases is even fading. A citizen can presently use his or her 
language (assuming that this coincides with the official language of his/her 
state, which is not the case for 1/8 of the entire European population…) with 
the European institutions (free choice), but every time he or she crosses a 
state (and in some cases even a regional) border, he or she must use a 
different language (imposition). And this occurs within the same integrated 
constitutional space, determining language rights and thus the present 
paradoxical situation. 
The integrated constitutional dimension urges the EU to bring its 
multicultural elements more to the fore, by making its pluralistic deficit 
clearer. In a short- to medium-term perspective, it thus seems unavoidable to 
leave the purely state-centric approach behind and, consequently, the EU’ s 
merely multinational character. Concretely, this does not mean to adopt one 
sole official (and maybe artificial)
110 language in Europe, but at least to 
attenuate the absolute parity of languages (which is still the formal rule in the 
Community) and to improve the number of cases in which languages can enjoy 
a differentiated treatment at Community level as well (as it is in fact already 
the case within many institutions and maybe already the factual rule in the 
Community).
111 In simple terms, a “transformation from ‘integral’ to limited 
multilingualism” will be required.
112 
As a consequence, the EU will cease to be a multinational polity, and will 
become instead a multicultural (and still multilingual) one, having minorities 
and majorities within itself, and also being formally enabled to contribute 
(together with the member states and the other actors of the integrated 
 
 
109  To continue the example of the previous footnote, the States could then find it convenient to send 
functionaries to European meetings who are able to fluently use some foreign languages rather than 
to use the funds for translation. 
110 Like e.g. the funny “common” language invented by an Italian translator, Diego Marani, called 
Europanto, derives from by an original and fuzzy mixture of all European languages. In the author’s 
definition “Europanto esse keine lingua, aber rather eine provocatione contra linguistische 
integralisme”. See Diego Marani, “Glossario analfabetico dell'eurolingua?”, 1 liMes (2002), 99-110, 
at 109. 
111 See, on this subject, the pivotal judgment of the CFI of 12 July 2001, Kik v. Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market, case T-120/99, and supra, note 43. See further Milian i 
Massana, Le régime linguistique de l’Union Européenne …. 
112  Peter A. Kraus, “Political Unity and Linguistic Diversity in Europe”, 1 XLI Archives Européennes de 
Sociologie (2000), 137-162. 
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constitutional space) to protect them. By this means, it will be possible and 
even necessary to give up the (absolute) parity of the languages, thus allowing 
the ECJ to strengthen its jurisprudence on substantive equality and to enforce 
the principle of pluralism within the integrated constitutional space. 
Maybe the Danish proposal made during the accession negotiations should 
finally be taken seriously. 
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